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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal comes to us following a seventeen-day 
bench trial that involved several claims arising under federal 
and state environmental laws.  At issue is which parties bear 
the responsibility for the removal of hazardous substances 
present in the soil and groundwater at a parcel of land in 
Somerville, New Jersey (the Litgo Property or Property).  
Although this issue is complicated by the fact that the 
Property has been the site of various private and public 
concerns since 1910, the District Court engaged in a careful 
examination of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, 
and we essentially agree with its adjudication of the case.  We 
disagree with the District Court’s determination, however, in 
two respects, and will reverse in part and remand. 
I.  Background 
A.  Contamination of the Litgo Property 
 The Litgo Property is located at 40 Haynes Street in 
Somerville, New Jersey.  During the past century, title to the 
Property has passed hands many times, and the site has been 
put to various uses.  Somerville Iron Works, a company that 
operated a sanitary landfill on adjacent tracts of land, owned 
the Property in the early 1900s and used it to manufacture 
pipes and fittings.  In 1941, the Property was leased to 
Columbia Aircraft, a manufacturer that machined precision 
parts for the United States military effort during World War 
II.  Decades later, in 1976, the Property was purchased by 
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Alfred Sanzari, who converted the buildings thereon into 
warehouses.  Those warehouses were then leased to a number 
of commercial and industrial tenants, including a company 
known as JANR Transport, Inc. 
 Both the soil and the groundwater on the Litgo 
Property became contaminated as a result of the commercial 
activity that occurred there over the years.  The soil contained 
high levels of metals and petroleum hydrocarbons, and the 
groundwater currently contains a high level of volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs), including trichloroethylene 
(TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE).  The District Court 
provided a thorough account of the history of this 
contamination in its opinion, see Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Martin 
(Litgo I), 2010 WL 2400388, at *2–19 (D.N.J. June 10, 
2010), on reconsideration in part, 2011 WL 65933 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 7, 2011) (Litgo II), and so we will recount it only briefly 
here. 
 The contamination most likely began in the 1940s, 
when Columbia Aircraft leased the Property.  Columbia 
Aircraft machined precision parts on-site for military 
equipment using some equipment owned by the United States 
government, including boring mills, grinding machines, 
lathers, milling machines, and a shaper.  After the precision 
parts were machined, they were cleaned of excess grease as 
part of the “finishing” process.  Columbia Aircraft degreased 
the precision parts in vapor degreaser tanks, using TCE as the 
degreasing agent.  It then disposed of the TCE by dumping it 
onto the ground and allowing it to evaporate. 
 The contamination worsened after a series of accidents 
that occurred between 1983 and 1987.  In 1983, a company 
known as Signo Trading International was storing both 
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hazardous and non-hazardous waste at a location other than 
the Litgo Property.  Some of this waste had been generated by 
the United States, which had contracted with Resource 
Technologies Service (RTS), a then-reputable hazardous 
waste transporter, for its disposal.  RTS had arranged to store 
the waste at Signo’s property, but the waste containers were 
removed under the supervision of the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) following a fire in 
April 1983.  Signo was allowed to send non-hazardous 
substances to a location of its choice, but NJDEP was 
responsible for ensuring that the hazardous wastes were 
moved by licensed haulers to licensed facilities.  As a result 
of NJDEP’s inadequate supervision, thousands of containers 
of materials were shipped to the JANR warehouse on the 
Litgo Property, and some of them contained hazardous waste. 
 In 1984, the Borough of Somerville became aware that 
hazardous materials were being stored improperly at the 
JANR warehouse, and that many of the containers were 
spilling and leaking.  An inspection and inventory of the 
materials at the warehouse revealed that it contained 106 
gallons of TCE.  NJDEP hired an inexperienced contractor to 
remediate the site, resulting in significant problems, including 
spills and leaks.  Both TCE and PCE were likely released into 
the soil and the groundwater during the warehouse cleanup, 
contributing to the contamination.   
 Some of the remedial actions that have since taken 
place at the Litgo Property may have contributed further to 
the contamination.  Sanzari—the owner of the Litgo Property 
between 1976 and 1990—hired environmental consultants to 
investigate the extent of the contamination and conduct 
remedial activities, such as soil excavations.  One of the 
monitoring wells installed on the Property, however, had a 
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faulty seal, a defect that likely increased the zone of 
contamination on the Property. 
 Although significant action has since been taken to 
remediate the soil contamination, groundwater contamination 
remains a significant problem on the Litgo Property.  In this 
case, the central issue is who should be held responsible for 
past and future remediation. 
B.  The Litgo Appellants’ Involvement at the Litgo Property 
 The Litgo Property is currently owned by Appellant 
Litgo New Jersey, Inc., a single purpose entity.  Its sole 
shareholder, Appellant Sheldon Goldstein, first learned about 
the Property in the 1980s from an acquaintance, Lawrence 
Seidman, who suggested forming a partnership to develop it.  
Goldstein, who had previous experience in real estate, 
intended to have the Property rezoned for residential use, get 
approvals to build townhouses, and then sell the Property.  He 
entered into an agreement of sale (Sales Agreement) with 
Sanzari to acquire the Property in August 1985.   
 Goldstein knew at the time that he entered into the 
Sales Agreement with Sanzari that there were problems with 
the site.  Sanzari had informed him that there was some soil 
contamination, and a letter from NJDEP, incorporated by 
reference into the Sales Agreement, stated that hazardous 
wastes were being improperly stored at the JANR warehouse 
and that Sanzari had been ordered to take remedial steps.  
Goldstein was not, however, aware that TCE was present in 
the groundwater.  Before entering the sale, he neither visited 
the Property nor further investigated the environmental 
issues.   
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 The Sales Agreement stated that Sanzari would 
comply with all of the provisions of the New Jersey 
Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA), as well 
as obtain a cleanup plan from NJDEP.  It also provided, 
however, that if the costs of obtaining and processing a 
cleanup plan were to exceed $100,000, Sanzari would have 
the option of terminating the Sales Agreement, unless 
Goldstein agreed to pay all costs in excess of $100,000.   
 NJDEP rejected Sanzari’s proposed cleanup plan, and 
Sanzari—concerned about the potential cleanup costs—
attempted to exercise his right to cancel the contract.  
Goldstein sought specific performance of the Sales 
Agreement in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  During the 
suit, Goldstein hired an environmental consulting firm, 
EWMA, to review the compliance documents and cost 
estimates created by Sanzari’s environmental consultants.  
EWMA criticized the reports for not fully disclosing the soil 
contamination and for failing to address potential 
groundwater issues.  It found that the actual costs of a cleanup 
could not be accurately estimated based on the present 
information, and concluded that the actual costs could be far 
greater than the existing estimate.   
 Nevertheless, Sanzari and Goldstein reached an 
agreement regarding the Litgo Property, pursuant to which 
samples taken from monitoring wells on the Property would 
be tested for various substances.  Goldstein could elect to 
move forward with the transaction within ten days of 
receiving the results, and, if he did so, he would assume all 
ECRA compliance costs in excess of $100,000.   
 The wells were tested for VOCs, including TCE, as 
well as metals, PCBs, pesticides, and cyanide.  Sanzari 
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received the preliminary results for all of the substances, but 
sent only the preliminary results for metals, PCBs, pesticides, 
and cyanide to Goldstein’s counsel.  He also failed to disclose 
that there were concerns about TCE contamination on a farm 
near the Litgo Property.   
 Meanwhile, Goldstein’s partner, Seidman, decided not 
to proceed with the sale because of concerns about potential 
environmental costs.  Goldstein nevertheless reelected to 
proceed with the transaction in June 1989.  Thereafter, 
Goldstein received a report that included the full test results, 
stating that the TCE levels at the Property exceeded NJDEP 
guidelines. 
 When he discovered that he would be responsible for 
additional groundwater investigation, Goldstein tried to refuse 
to take title to the Litgo Property, but the New Jersey 
Superior Court issued an order in December 1989 requiring 
him to proceed with the transaction.  After he assumed 
ownership of the Property and Sanzari’s obligations under the 
cleanup plan, Goldstein transferred title of the Property to 
Litgo New Jersey.   
 Beginning in 1990, Goldstein and Litgo New Jersey 
(the Litgo Appellants) retained two environmental consultants 
(first EWMA, and, after a dispute with EWMA, JM Sorge, 
Inc.) to carry out the cleanup plan.  The consultants 
investigated the soil contamination and conducted remedial 
activities, including the excavation of contaminated soil.  The 
Litgo Appellants did not, however, conduct comprehensive 
sampling for VOCs until 1997.  Although they have installed 
multiple wells on or near the Property to determine the extent 
of the groundwater contamination, they had not, at the time of 
trial, engaged in any work to remediate that contamination.   
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C.  Prior Litigation 
 Before filing the present action, Goldstein had been 
involved in several other lawsuits regarding the 
contamination at the Litgo Property.  In 1996, he filed a 
lawsuit in the New Jersey Superior Court against multiple 
parties, including Sanzari, Sanzari’s environmental 
consultants, and Dande Plastics, a company that conducted 
machining and manufacturing operations at a building near 
the Litgo Property.  He alleged, among other things, that 
Sanzari’s environmental consultants had failed to properly 
investigate and remediate the TCE contamination at the Litgo 
Property.  The New Jersey Superior Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the consultants.  Goldstein also asserted 
a Spill Act claim against Dande Plastics, asserting that it was 
a source of contamination at the Property.  The District Court 
granted Dande Plastics’ motion to dismiss in part, and 
Goldstein and Dande Plastics then settled the remainder of the 
claims for $105,000.   
 Goldstein was also involved in a lawsuit against his 
environmental consultant, EWMA.  EWMA sued the Litgo 
Appellants after they failed to pay their bills, and the Litgo 
Appellants brought a counterclaim, asserting that EWMA had 
performed negligently and provided substandard services at 
the Property.   
D.  Current Litigation 
1.  Claims 
 In June 2006, the Litgo Appellants filed the present 
action in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey, which named the Sanzari Appellees and the 
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United States Appellees as defendants.
1
  The claims asserted 
in the complaint were aimed at shifting responsibility for the 
remediation onto the defendants.  
 First, the Litgo Appellants brought claims against the 
Sanzari Appellees and the United States Appellees under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
2
  As we 
shall explain in more detail, CERCLA § 107(a) allows private 
parties to seek compensation for the costs of remediation 
from parties that are statutorily responsible for the 
contamination.  The Litgo Appellants sought additional 
compensatory relief under the New Jersey Spill 
Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 58:10-23.11 et seq., a statute that functions much like 
CERCLA, except that it permits parties to recover costs 
incurred because of petroleum-related contamination.  Cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (excluding petroleum from the definition 
of “hazardous substance”).  The Sanzari Appellees and the 
United States Appellees filed counterclaims against the Litgo 
                                                   
1
 The Sanzari Appellees include the executors of 
Alfred Sanzari’s estate and Alfred Sanzari Enterprises.  The 
United States Appellees include the United States of America, 
the United States Department of the Army, the United States 
Department of the Air Force, and the United States 
Department of the Navy. 
2
 The Litgo Appellants also brought CERCLA claims 
against two other parties, Mian Realty and Kirby Avenue 
Realty Holdings.  They subsequently entered into a settlement 
agreement with Mian, and their claims against Kirby were 
dismissed at the close of trial.   
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Appellants and cross-claims against each other, seeking 
contribution for the remediation costs under CERCLA 
§ 113(f) and the Spill Act. 
 The Litgo Appellants also sought injunctive relief 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),  
42 U.S.C. § 6972, which permits citizen suits against any 
person who has contributed or is contributing to the disposal 
of waste in a way that might present an “imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”  42 
U.S.C. § 6972(a).   
 Finally, the Litgo Appellants sought rescission of the 
Sales Agreement under the New Jersey Sanitary Landfill 
Facility Closure Act and Contingency Fund (Closure Act), 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-100 et seq., a statute that requires 
sellers of land to disclose in the contract of sale whether the 
property has ever been used as a landfill. 
2.  The District Court’s Decisions 
 The District Court entered summary judgment in favor 
of the Sanzari Appellees on the Litgo Appellants’ RCRA 
claim.  It found that this claim was barred by New Jersey’s 
entire controversy doctrine because it should have been 
asserted in the 1996 New Jersey Superior Court proceedings.  
It held a bench trial on the remaining claims, which began on 
January 19, 2010 and ended on February 12, 2010.  For 
reasons that we shall discuss in more detail, the District Court 
determined that the Litgo Appellants, the Sanzari Appellees, 
and the United States Appellees were each liable for the costs 
of remediation under CERCLA.  It then allocated the 
percentage of costs to be borne by each party, ultimately 
assigning 70% of the costs to the Litgo Appellants, 27% of 
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the costs to the Sanzari Appellees, and 3% of the costs to the 
United States Appellees.  The District Court also found that 
the Sanzari Appellees and the Litgo Appellants were liable 
for the costs of remediation under the Spill Act, and allocated 
the Spill Act costs based on the same factors that it had 
considered in allocating the CERCLA costs. 
 The District Court determined that the United States 
Appellees were likely liable parties under RCRA, but 
expressed doubt as to whether injunctive relief would be 
appropriate.  It reserved judgment on that issue until after the 
damages hearing.  Finally, the District Court found that 
because the Litgo Property had not been used as a landfill, the 
Litgo Appellants were not entitled to rescission under the 
Closure Act.  
 The Litgo Appellants and the United States Appellees 
entered into a settlement agreement before the damages 
hearing was held.  The Litgo Appellants dismissed their claim 
for injunctive relief under RCRA, but claimed to have 
reserved the right to seek litigation costs from the United 
States Appellees as prevailing parties under RCRA.  The 
parties stipulated that the Litgo Appellants had incurred 
$1,729,279 in CERCLA response costs, and that the United 
States Appellees owed $51,878.37 based on their allocation.   
 Following the damages hearing, the District Court 
found that the Litgo Appellants had incurred $1,566,236.78 in 
recoverable costs under CERCLA, and denied the Litgo 
Appellants’ request for prejudgment interest.  It also found 
that the Litgo Appellants had incurred an additional 
$315,098.30 in recoverable costs under the Spill Act.  Finally, 
it held that the Litgo Appellants were not entitled to litigation 
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costs under RCRA because no relief had been granted on that 
claim.   
 The Litgo Appellants appealed, raising a plethora of 
challenges to the District Court’s liability determinations, its 
allocation of costs, and the damages award.  With respect to 
the CERCLA claims, they argue that the District Court: 
(1) erred when it held them liable as “operators”; (2) erred 
when it held that the United States Appellees were not liable 
as “owners” based on their involvement at the Columbia 
Aircraft site; (3) abused its discretion when it allocated 
CERCLA costs; and (4) erred when it denied their request for 
prejudgment interest.  In addition, the Litgo Appellants claim 
that the District Court’s allocation of costs under the Spill Act 
was an abuse of discretion.  As to their RCRA claims, they 
argue that the District Court erred in two respects: (1) in 
granting summary judgment for the Sanzari Appellees based 
on the entire controversy doctrine; and (2) in denying their 
request for litigation costs.  Finally, they claim that the 
District Court erred in denying their claim under the Closure 
Act. 
 The Sanzari Appellees cross-appealed.  Like the Litgo 
Appellants, they claim that the District Court’s allocation of 
CERCLA and Spill Act costs was an abuse of discretion.  
They also claim that the District Court erred in refusing to 
grant them a settlement credit for CERCLA damages. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the parties’ 
federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a) and 9613(b) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  It had supplemental jurisdiction over 
the parties’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We 
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have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may set 
aside the District Court’s factual findings only if they are 
clearly erroneous, and we exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s interpretation of the relevant statutes.  Agere 
Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 216 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We review the District Court’s allocation of 
costs for abuse of discretion.  Id. (citing Beazer E., Inc. v. 
Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 445 n.18 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
III.  CERCLA Claims 
A.  Overview 
 Congress enacted CERCLA “to promote the timely 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs 
of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for 
the contamination.”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257–58 (3d Cir. 1992).  To accomplish 
this goal, CERCLA § 107(a) gives private parties the right to 
recover costs incurred in cleaning up a waste site from 
“potentially responsible parties” (PRPs)—four broad classes 
of persons who may be held strictly liable for releases of 
hazardous substances that occur at a facility.  Burlington N., 
556 U.S. at 608−09 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)). 
 Under CERCLA, PRPs are: (1) current owners and 
operators of the “facility” at which the contamination 
occurred; (2) persons who were owners or operators of the 
facility “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance”; 
(3) persons who arranged for the disposal or treatment of the 
hazardous substance; and (4) persons who transported the 
hazardous substance.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).  A party falling 
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into one of these four categories will be liable when there is a 
“release” or a “threatened release” of a hazardous substance 
from the facility that generates response costs.  Id.; see 
Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 608−09; N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. 
PPG Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1999).  Once 
liability has been determined, the court allocates the 
remediation costs among the PRPs “using such equitable 
factors as [it] determines are appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f).  PRPs may seek contribution from other PRPs—
including the party that originally brought the § 107(a) 
action—under CERCLA § 113(f).  Id.; United States v. Atl. 
Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138–39 (2007).   
 Here, the District Court determined that the United 
States Appellees, the Sanzari Appellees, and the Litgo 
Appellants were each PRPs.  The Sanzari Appellees were 
liable because they had owned and operated the Litgo 
Property when hazardous waste was disposed at the JANR 
warehouse.  Litgo New Jersey was liable as the current owner 
of the Property, and both Litgo Appellants were liable as 
current operators of the Property.  The United States 
Appellees were liable because they arranged for the disposal 
of some of the hazardous waste that was ultimately stored at 
the JANR warehouse.  The District Court determined, 
however, that the United States Appellees did not incur PRP 
liability based on any releases that had occurred at the 
Columbia Aircraft site because they did not own any of the 
relevant facilities; they did not manage, direct, or conduct any 
of the operations at the Columbia Aircraft site; and they did 
not own or possess any of the VOCs that were disposed of at 
the Columbia Aircraft site.   
 The District Court then turned to the allocation of the 
remediation costs. It determined that the Sanzari Appellees 
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were responsible for 21% of the costs.
3
  Although it 
recognized that Sanzari was not directly involved in the 
generation, storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous 
wastes, it determined that he had nevertheless taken actions 
that justified assigning the Sanzari Appellees a significant 
percentage of the costs.  For example, Sanzari failed to 
provide Goldstein with a full set of the preliminary test results 
from the monitoring wells and with information regarding 
TCE contamination on a nearby plot of land before Goldstein 
opted to proceed with purchasing the Property.  The Court 
explained that Sanzari was “the only party that had notice of 
the full extent of the contamination prior to Goldstein’s 
election yet acted in a manner which would ensure that 
someone else—Goldstein—would have to take the 
responsibility for the remediation.”  Litgo I, 2010 WL 
2400388, at *39.  Additionally, one of Sanzari’s 
environmental contractors installed a monitoring well with a 
faulty seal, and this seal, “which was discoverable and 
fixable,” likely increased the extent of contamination.  Id. at 
*38. 
                                                   
3
 Initially, the District Court allocated 25% of the costs 
to the Sanzari Appellees, based in part on its determination 
that they should have taken more action to remediate the 
conditions at the JANR warehouse.  Upon careful 
consideration of the parties’ motions to reconsider, however, 
the Court found that the Sanzari Appellees did, in fact, 
behave reasonably with respect to the JANR warehouse, and 
it decreased their share of the responsibility by 4%.  It 
determined that the Litgo Appellants’ share should 
accordingly be increased by 4%.   
 19 
 
 The District Court found that the Litgo Appellants 
were responsible for 54% of the response costs.  It found 
them liable as PRPs “based solely on their current ownership 
and operation of the Litgo Property,” and acknowledged that 
they had not been directly involved in the generation, storage, 
treatment, or disposal of hazardous wastes.  Id. at *39.  It also 
acknowledged that the Litgo Appellants’ only activities on 
the site “have been those necessary to remove and remediate 
the soil and groundwater contamination.”  Id.  The Court 
found, however, that the Litgo Appellants had consistently 
put off taking any steps to remediate the groundwater 
contamination, and this lack of action may have increased the 
threat to the environment and the public.  Additionally, 
Goldstein, in the Sales Agreement, had agreed to remediate 
the Property in accordance with ECRA, and accepted 
financial responsibility for remediation beyond the first 
$100,000.  Although he did not know specifically that there 
was TCE contamination, he was aware that there were 
significant environmental issues, and voluntarily assumed that 
risk.  The District Court also noted that the Litgo Appellants 
were the only parties that stood to benefit financially from the 
remediation of the Property.   
 The United States Appellees, in contrast, were 
allocated only 2% of the costs.  The Court noted that they had 
previously generated and possessed some of the hazardous 
substances that were transferred to the JANR warehouse, and 
that some of those substances may have been released there.  
However, it explained that the United States Appellees had 
not been involved in the transportation of the substances to 
the Litgo Property, in their storage in the JANR warehouse, 
or in their treatment and disposal.  It also found that the 
United States Appellees had exercised reasonable care 
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regarding the transportation of the substances by entrusting 
them to a hazardous waste disposal contractor who, at the 
time, was considered reputable.  It explained that, “[a]lthough 
the United States [Appellees] arranged for the disposal of 
these wastes, the materials they generated appear to have 
reached the JANR warehouse only due to the inappropriate 
and potentially illegal conduct of other third-party actors not 
involved in the suit.”  Litgo II, 2011 WL 65933, at *6. 
 The District Court then determined that the poor 
execution of the JANR warehouse cleanup—which had been 
overseen by NJDEP—had contributed to the contamination at 
the Litgo Property.  Because of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, however, NJDEP could not be held liable.  The 
Court thus assigned the NJDEP Commissioner an “orphan 
share” of 23% of the costs.
4
  It then distributed these costs 
among the PRPs.  After this recalculation, the Sanzari 
Appellees were ultimately responsible for 27% of the costs, 
the Litgo Appellants were responsible for 70% of the costs, 
and the United States Appellees were responsible for 3% of 
the costs. 
                                                   
4
 When a court cannot “assign an ideal measure of 
monetary responsibility to an otherwise responsible party”—
because, for example, that party is immune from suit, 
bankrupt, or defunct—this gives rise to an orphan share.  
United States v. Kramer, 953 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D.N.J. 
1997).  A court may equitably allocate orphan shares among 
liable parties at its discretion.  Stearns & Foster Bedding Co. 
v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 801 (D.N.J. 
1996). 
 21 
 
 Both the Litgo Appellants and the Sanzari Appellees 
raise multiple challenges to the District Court’s analysis of 
the CERCLA claims.  First, the Litgo Appellants contend that 
the District Court incorrectly identified who could be held 
liable as PRPs under CERCLA.  They claim that the United 
States Appellees should have been liable as past owners based 
on their involvement in Columbia Aircraft’s manufacturing 
operations, and that the Litgo Appellants should not have 
been found liable as current operators.  Second, both the 
Litgo Appellants and the Sanzari Appellees contend that the 
District Court abused its discretion in allocating costs among 
the liable parties.  Third, the Sanzari Appellees argue that the 
District Court erred in failing to assign it a settlement credit, 
based on the United States Appellees’ stipulation to the 
amount of damages.  Finally, the Litgo Appellants contend 
that the District Court erred in denying their request for 
prejudgment interest.  We address each of these contentions 
in turn. 
B.  PRP Liability 
1.  “Current Operator” Liability 
 The District Court did not err in finding that the Litgo 
Appellants were liable as current operators under CERCLA.  
An operator is “someone who directs the workings of, 
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility.”  United States 
v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998).
5
  For that role to subject 
                                                   
5
 The Litgo Property is undisputedly a “facility” for 
CERCLA purposes.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (“facility” 
includes “any site or area where a hazardous substance has 
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise 
come to be located”). 
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someone to CERCLA liability, the operator must “manage, 
direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, 
that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of 
hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with 
environmental regulations.”  Id. at 66–67.  Here, the District 
Court found that the Litgo Appellants were actively involved 
in activities related to the contamination on the Litgo 
Property: not only did the Litgo Appellants have the actual 
authority to make decisions about compliance with 
environmental regulations, they hired environmental 
consultants to conduct tests and remediation operations on the 
Litgo Property, and they oversaw that work. 
 Relying on United States v. Bestfoods, the Litgo 
Appellants argue that they should not be held liable as current 
operators because they have only managed remedial activities 
on the site.  That is, they argue, they have not engaged in any 
operations that caused further contamination, so they have not 
been involved in “operations specifically related to 
pollution,” id. at 66.  This interpretation reads Bestfoods far 
too narrowly, and is contrary to CERCLA’s liability scheme. 
 Under CERCLA, current operators—like all other 
classes of PRPs—are held strictly liable for all releases that 
occur at a facility.  See Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 608 (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).  The statute does not require a showing 
that the operator was directly responsible for the release of a 
hazardous substance for PRP liability to attach.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (PRP liability attaches when a current 
“owner [or] operator of . . . a facility . . . from which there is a 
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence 
of response costs, of a hazardous substance.” (emphasis 
added)); Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d at 264–66.  Indeed, 
in the case of a current operator, as opposed to a past 
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operator, the plaintiff is not even required to show that the 
party was an operator when an active “disposal” of hazardous 
waste occurred. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (PRP status 
applies to “the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility”), 
with 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (PRP status applies to “any 
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of” (emphasis added)).  
The plaintiff need only show that the party engaged in 
operations related to pollution and that a “release” of 
hazardous substances occurred, a requirement that can be met 
by showing that there was a passive migration of waste.  See 
United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 715 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)); see also id. at 714 
(“disposal,” by contrast, requires more than passive migration 
of contaminants).  
 A determination that current operators cannot be held 
liable unless they have actually engaged in polluting activities 
would require us to disregard the distinction between past and 
present operators set out in the statute.  See id. at 715 
(explaining that Congress must have intended for current 
owners and operators and past owners and operators to be 
liable under different circumstances, as it distinguished 
between the two in the definition of PRP).  It would also add 
a causation requirement that is not found in the text.
6
  The 
                                                   
6
 Nor does this requirement have strong support in case 
law.  The Litgo Appellants cite to Universal Paragon Corp. v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 2007 WL 518828, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
13, 2007), in which a district court refused to impose operator 
liability when the party “had no involvement in the 
contaminating activities.”  Litgo Br. 32.  But there, the district 
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Supreme Court has recognized that, under CERCLA’s broad 
liability scheme, “even parties not responsible for 
contamination may fall within the broad definitions of PRP,” 
Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 136 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(1)), and, contrary to the Litgo Appellants’ 
suggestion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bestfoods does 
not create an exception for “innocent” operators.  Bestfoods 
addresses when a parent company can be held directly 
responsible for the activities of its subsidiary as an 
“operator.”  In defining “operator,” the Supreme Court 
employed broad, passive language: an operator is one who is 
involved in operations “having to do with the leakage or 
                                                                                                                  
court appears to conflate the requirements for being a current 
owner with the requirements for being a past owner, so the 
opinion is not especially persuasive.  The Litgo Appellants 
also cite to Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. ACME, Inc., a district 
court case asserting that “a person must affirmatively act to 
cause a release of hazardous waste to become an operator.”  
169 F. Supp. 2d 695, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1999).  This 
requirement, as discussed above, is not found in CERCLA.  
Nor is it found in United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 
F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit case on which 
Bob’s Beverage relies.  Township of Brighton states only that 
an operator must be actively involved on the site in some way 
that relates to the pollution; it does not provide that the 
operator must have caused the release.  See id. at 314–15.  In 
any event, the Litgo Appellants did exercise actual control 
over pollution-related operations at the Litgo Property by 
taking affirmative actions: they conducted tests and hired 
contractors to perform remediation operations on the 
property. 
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disposal of hazardous waste,” Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66–67 
(emphasis added), not one who is involved in operations 
“causing” or “leading to” the leakage or disposal of waste.  
Moreover, the Court expressly noted that operator liability 
may be imposed when a party is responsible for “decisions 
about compliance with environmental regulations,” id. at 67, 
a description which directly applies to the Litgo Appellants’ 
activities at the Property.
7
 
 This interpretation does not—as the Litgo Appellants 
suggest—lead to unfair consequences.  Although CERCLA’s 
strict liability regime may subject “innocent” private parties 
to liability, see Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 136, innocent 
owners and operators do have some protection.  After 
identifying PRPs, courts allocate response costs based on 
equitable factors.  An operator who has participated in 
remediation without slowing or interfering with that process 
likely will not be assessed a large share of the remediation 
costs, if it is assessed any at all.  See, e.g., Am. Color & 
Chem. Corp. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 945, 
959–60 (D.S.C. 1995) (0% to current owner and operator); 
                                                   
7
 The Litgo Appellants also cite to several district court 
cases suggesting that mere investigation into contamination 
will not, by itself, subject a party to current operator PRP 
liability.  See City of Grass Valley v. Newmont Mining Corp., 
2007 WL 4287603, at *5 & n.3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2007); 
Spectrum Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Universal Coops., Inc., 2006 
WL 2033377, at *2, *5–6 (D. Minn. July 17, 2006).  But the 
Litgo Appellants have been actively involved in remediation 
operations on the site, so we need not here decide whether 
purely investigative activities could subject a party to 
operator liability. 
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Alcan-Toyo Am., Inc. v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 881 F. Supp. 342, 
346–47 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (10% to current owner).  An operator 
who has delayed with remediation, however, may still receive 
a share of the remediation costs, see Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 
156 F.3d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other 
grounds by W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 
F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2009), in accordance with CERCLA’s 
purpose of encouraging prompt cleanup, see Burlington N., 
556 U.S. at 602. 
2.  “Past Owner” Liability 
 The District Court did not err in finding that the United 
States Appellees are not “past owners” based on their 
involvement at the Columbia Aircraft manufacturing site; 
they are PRPs only because they arranged for the disposal of 
hazardous substances that may have eventually been released 
at the JANR warehouse.   
 A party may be liable as a past owner when, “at the 
time of disposal of any hazardous substance,” it “owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances 
were disposed of.”  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).  CERCLA 
defines “facility” broadly as: 
(A) any building, structure, installation, 
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe 
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment 
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, 
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, 
rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area 
where a hazardous substance has been 
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or 
otherwise come to be located. 
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42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).  The District Court found that there 
were only two relevant “facilities” at which hazardous 
substances had been disposed in this case—the Litgo Property 
(as a “site or area”), and the vapor degreasers used to clean 
the precision parts (as “equipment”).  It found that the United 
States Appellees did not own either of those facilities.  
 The Litgo Appellants raise two challenges to the 
District Court’s determination.  First, they argue that the 
evidence shows that the government-owned equipment leased 
by Columbia Aircraft—which clearly falls within the 
definition of a “facility”—was cleaned using TCE, and this 
constitutes a disposal of hazardous waste.  Second, they claim 
that the United States Appellees’ ownership of some of the 
equipment used in Columbia Aircraft’s manufacturing 
process is sufficient to subject them to ownership liability. 
 The Litgo Appellants’ first challenge is meritless.  The 
District Court found that the precision parts manufactured by 
Columbia Aircraft were degreased using TCE as a solvent, 
but it rejected the claim that TCE was used to clean the 
equipment used in the manufacturing process.  The Litgo 
Appellants’ expert did testify that TCE was commonly used 
at the time to service electrical motors and other parts of 
machinery.  This testimony, however, was focused on the use 
of TCE to degrease airplane parts.  When asked whether TCE 
would have been used “on the equipment itself,” the expert 
responded only that it was a “possibility.”  He also testified 
that other solvents, like acetone, could have been used instead 
of TCE.  Thus, the District Court’s factual determination that 
there was no direct relationship between the government-
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owned equipment and the TCE solvents was not clearly 
erroneous. 
 The Litgo Appellants also claim that the United States 
Appellees were “owners” of a facility where TCE was 
disposed during the 1940s because they owned part of a 
“process installation”—that is, they owned machinery and 
equipment that was a necessary part of the manufacturing 
process.  In particular, the United States Appellees owned 
some of the equipment that Columbia Aircraft used to 
manufacture precision parts, and Columbia Aircraft disposed 
of TCE when it degreased those parts later in the production 
process, using separate machinery (vapor degreasers).  The 
Litgo Appellants, relying primarily on United States v. 
Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2010),
8
 argue that 
this is enough to subject the United States Appellees to past 
owner liability.  We disagree. 
                                                   
8
 The Litgo Appellants also rely on American 
International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. v. United States , 
2010 WL 2635768 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2010), which states 
that there need not be evidence that any specific piece of 
equipment owned by the defendant was responsible for a 
specific release; “[i]t is enough that the components owned by 
the defendant were ‘a necessary part’ of the manufacturing 
process.”  Id. at *23 (citing Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 
1056).  However, in American International Specialty Lines, 
some of the government-owned equipment was directly 
involved in the release of hazardous waste.  For example, the 
government owned “grinders” that created perchlorate dust, 
one of the waste products at issue in the case.  Id. at *8−9.  
These grinders were then cleaned with VOCs, including TCE.  
Id.  
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 Under the Litgo Appellants’ view, if a party owns any 
equipment used at a manufacturing site, it can be held 
responsible for the disposal of hazardous waste that occurs at 
other pieces of equipment elsewhere at the site, as long as the 
two pieces of equipment are part of the same overarching 
“process.”  This broad definition of facility finds no support 
in CERCLA. 
 The term “process installation” is not used in 
CERCLA’s definition of “facility,” although “installation” is 
mentioned.
9
  Installation generally means “a thing installed, 
in particular: a large piece of equipment installed for use.”  
Concise Oxford American Dictionary 464 (2006); see also 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 988 (2d 
ed. 1987) (defining installation as “something installed, as 
machinery or apparatus placed in position or connected for 
use”).  It is a physical item: a piece of machinery or 
equipment that has been installed.  This fits well with the 
other types of “facility” listed in the definition, all of which 
are physical.  See Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 
U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (“[W]ords grouped in a list should be 
given related meaning.”).  The Litgo Appellants’ attempt to 
define “installation” more conceptually—as a process, 
potentially made up of various discrete pieces of machinery 
that may or may not be located near each other or used 
together—is not supported by the statutory language. 
                                                   
9
 “Process installation,” as far as we can tell, is simply 
a phrase used by the Litgo Appellants’ counsel and expert 
during the expert’s testimony.  See App. 2757.  It does not 
appear in other cases, and the Litgo Appellants do not explain 
the term’s origin. 
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 It may nevertheless be possible for two pieces of 
equipment to be sufficiently close in relation to each other 
that they should be considered components in a larger piece 
of machinery (which may, itself, be “equipment” or an 
“installation”).  See, e.g., Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 
(determining that the party was liable based on ownership of 
necessary equipment in a plating line).  Here, however, the 
District Court reasonably determined that no such relationship 
between the government-owned equipment and the vapor 
degreasers existed.  There is no suggestion that the equipment 
owned by the United States Appellees was in any way 
attached to the vapor degreaser tanks that disposed of waste 
or used in close connection with them.  The only relationship 
between the vapor degreasers and the United States 
Appellees’ equipment is that both were used by Columbia 
Aircraft to manufacture precision parts.  They were not, 
however, used at the same stage of the production process.  
Accordingly, we will uphold the determination that there was 
insufficient evidence to connect the equipment owned by the 
United States Appellees to the disposal or release of 
hazardous substances, and that the United States Appellees 
thus were not past owners under CERCLA. 
C.  Allocation of Costs 
 The Litgo Appellants and Sanzari Appellees argue that 
the District Court’s allocation of costs under CERCLA was 
an abuse of discretion.
10
  In our view, the District Court 
                                                   
 
10
 The Litgo Appellants also contend that the District 
Court abused its discretion when it declined to hold a separate 
hearing on how costs should be allocated among the PRPs, 
and instead allocated costs after the seventeen-day bench trial 
on the merits.  Courts may hold a separate hearing to allocate 
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carefully and judiciously compared the parties’ relative fault 
both in its initial opinion on the merits and upon 
reconsideration. 
 First, the parties challenge multiple findings of fact 
upon which the District Court relied in allocating costs, 
including: (1) that the Sanzari Appellees’ environmental 
consultant installed a faulty seal on one of the monitoring 
wells; (2) that the Sanzari Appellees failed to deliver a full set 
of preliminary groundwater test results and failed to disclose 
information about TCE contamination on a nearby property; 
(3) that the Litgo Appellants deliberately slowed the 
remediation process; (4) that the Litgo Appellants, unlike the 
other PRPs, stood to benefit from the remediation; and 
(5) that the United States Appellees exercised reasonable care 
in hiring a reputable contractor to transport the waste.  They 
also claim that the District Court should have found that the 
United States Appellees did not cooperate with NJDEP’s 
cleanup of the JANR warehouse.   
                                                                                                                  
costs, and sometimes choose to do so.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (describing three 
phases of a trial on a § 107(a) claim involving over 100 
defendants).  But CERCLA does not require courts to 
conduct a separate allocation hearing.  See Acushnet Co. v. 
Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69, 82 (1st Cir. 1999) (“CERCLA 
does not demand a bifurcated trial on this score, nor have we 
insisted that the many knotty issues that arise in the typical 
CERCLA action be resolved in any particular chronological 
order.”).   Here, the Litgo Appellants did not even request a 
bifurcated trial—the United States Appellees did—and the 
District Court reasonably determined that separate 
proceedings were unnecessary in this case. 
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 After carefully reviewing the record, we cannot 
conclude that any of these findings of fact was clearly 
erroneous.  With respect to the faulty monitoring well, the 
United States Appellees’ expert testified that the cement seal 
that was supposed to be around the monitoring well “was 
missing, had degraded or crumbled, or maybe was never 
installed properly in the first place.”  See App. 3663.  From 
this testimony, the District Court could reasonably infer that 
some mistake had occurred during the installation process—
either the seal was never secured properly, or it became loose 
over time because of the manner in which it was installed. 
 There is also sufficient evidence to support the District 
Court’s finding that the Litgo Appellants did not receive a full 
set of preliminary test results and that the Sanzari Appellees 
did not disclose information about contamination at a nearby 
property.  At trial, the Litgo Appellants introduced an April 
1989 letter from Sanzari’s attorney to Goldstein’s attorney.  
The letter included information about some of the 
contaminants on the Property but omitted information about 
VOCs, including TCE.  See App. 6192.  Although the Sanzari 
Appellees argue that the relevant information may have been 
provided shortly thereafter, at a time when Goldstein still had 
the opportunity to back out of the transaction, the District 
Court was not required to so find.  The Litgo Appellants also 
presented evidence at trial showing that there was 
contamination at a well close to the Property that the Sanzari 
Appellees were aware of, but did not disclose.  See App. 5346 
(letter to Sanzari from Ken Hortsman stating that he had 
instructed the environmental consultant not to include 
information about the alleged existence of groundwater 
contamination in Bridgewater, New Jersey in his report to 
NJDEP); App. 4142–46 (testimony regarding the 
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contamination of the nearby property and the Hortsman 
letter).  Again, while the Sanzari Appellees dispute the 
inferences that may be drawn from these communications and 
testimony, it was not clear error for the District Court to rely 
on them. 
 The record also supports the District Court’s finding 
that the Litgo Appellants deliberately slowed the remediation 
process. For example, Goldstein’s deposition testimony, used 
at trial for impeachment purposes, suggests that he instructed 
the consultants to slow down the groundwater investigation: 
[Q:]  You’re saying that [the consultant] 
recommended to you that you should stall the 
DEP? 
[A:]  No.  No professional would ever 
recommend to stall.  He felt that we should do 
what the DEP is saying we should do, but not—
not as fast as they’re looking for, but don’t stall.  
I mean, you know, I don’t think any 
professional would ever stall the DEP. 
. . .  
[Q:] Well, wasn’t he actually recommending to 
you that you offer as a more aggressive 
approach to delineate the groundwater in the 
southeast and propose a mediation technique 
for— 
. . . 
[A:] I told him that I was not interested at this 
point in doing and learning how bad this thing 
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is going to be because he was talking 
astronomical numbers and we should just not 
get boxed in to where it may cost me five or six 
million dollars. 
See App. 1416; see also App. 1418 (Goldstein wanted to “go 
very slowly” because the contamination “could be a 
monstrous thing”).  The District Court reasonably found that 
“groundwater contamination continues to migrate 
downstream,” and so the Litgo Appellants’ “lack of action 
over the past twenty years may well have increased the threat 
to the environment and public health.”  App. 126; see also 
App. 2175–76 (plumes are continuing to migrate). 
 Nor was the District Court’s determination that the 
Litgo Appellants were the only parties that stood to benefit 
from the remediation clearly erroneous.  Because of the 
contamination, the Litgo Property is currently unusable and 
cannot be developed.  If the land could be developed after 
remediation, it would increase its value, and the Litgo 
Appellants are the only parties that stand to benefit from such 
an increase.  See Alcan-Toyo Am., Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 347 
(finding that the current owner was the only party that would 
“reap the benefits of the environmental cleanup of its 
property,” and so it should bear a portion of the costs). 
 The District Court’s findings with respect to the 
United States Appellees were also supported by the record.  
The Litgo Appellants and Sanzari Appellees claim there was 
insufficient evidence to show that the United States Appellees 
exercised reasonable care in disposing of waste.  They argue 
that the only evidence supporting the Court’s finding was 
testimony from an NJDEP witness, who stated that NJDEP 
believed at the time that RTS, the contractor the United States 
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Appellees used, was reputable.  This testimony suffices.  
NJDEP’s testimony as to its own views about the contractor 
could support an inference that the contractor had a good 
reputation at that time.  Finally, the record does not mandate a 
finding that the United States Appellees failed to cooperate 
with NJDEP in cleaning up the JANR warehouse.  As the 
District Court explained, NJDEP contacted the United States 
Appellees in an attempt to identify the source of the 
contaminants in the warehouse, but there was no testimony 
suggesting that NJDEP ever asked or expected the United 
States Appellees to help remove the hazardous substances at 
that time.  Thus, the District Court reasonably concluded that 
the United States Appellees did not “fail to cooperate” with 
NJDEP. 
 The Litgo Appellants and the Sanzari Appellees assert 
further challenges both to the particular factors considered by 
the District Court and the weight given to each.  CERCLA 
does not specify which factors courts must consider in 
allocating costs among responsible parties; instead, it 
provides that, “[i]n resolving contribution claims, the court 
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such 
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”  
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (emphasis added).  This provision affords 
district courts tremendous discretion.  As we have previously 
explained, “[c]ourts examining this language and its history 
have concluded that Congress intended to grant the district 
courts significant flexibility in determining equitable 
allocations of response costs, without requiring the courts to 
prioritize, much less consider, any specific factor.”  Beazer 
E., 412 F.3d at 446. 
 Some of the factors frequently considered by courts, 
taken from an unsuccessful amendment to CERCLA, are 
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known as the “Gore factors.” See Matter of Bell Petroleum 
Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 899 (5th Cir. 1993).  They include: 
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate 
that their contribution to a discharge, 
release or disposal of a hazardous waste 
can be distinguished; 
(ii)  the amount of the hazardous waste 
involved; 
(iii)  the degree of toxicity of the hazardous 
waste involved; 
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties 
in the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, or disposal of the 
hazardous waste; 
(v)  the degree of care exercised by the 
parties with respect to the hazardous 
waste concerned, taking into account the 
characteristics of such hazardous waste; 
and 
(vi)  the degree of cooperation by the parties 
with the Federal, State or local officials 
to prevent any harm to the public health 
or the environment. 
Id. at 899–900 (internal alteration omitted); United States v. 
Kramer, 644 F. Supp. 2d 479, 493 n.13 (D.N.J. 2008).   
 Courts are not, however, bound to consider each of the 
Gore factors, nor are they limited to considering only the 
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Gore factors.  Beazer E., 412 F.3d at 446; Envtl. Transp. Sys., 
Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(§ 9613(f) “does not limit courts to any particular list of 
factors, nor does the section direct the courts to employ any 
particular test”).  Nevertheless, both the Litgo Appellants and 
the Sanzari Appellees argue that the District Court should 
have given more weight to the fact that the United States 
Appellees were the only identified generators of waste, and 
the fact that the Litgo Appellants and the Sanzari Appellees 
did not contribute anything to the contamination. They also 
claim that the District Court erred in failing to take into 
consideration the United States Appellees’ business 
relationship with Columbia Aircraft. 
 The Court thoroughly compared the role the United 
States Appellees played in the contamination with that of the 
Litgo Appellants and the Sanzari Appellees—parties whose 
active concealment or resistance to remediation may have 
worsened the conditions at the Litgo Property.  The United 
States Appellees arranged for hazardous waste to be disposed 
of by what was then considered to be a reputable contractor, 
and the waste reached the JANR warehouse only because of 
third-party actors.  
 Nor did the Court abuse its discretion in declining to 
consider the United States Appellees’ relationship with 
Columbia Aircraft in the 1940s.  The District Court found that 
it would be “inappropriate” to assign the United States 
Appellees additional costs based on conduct that would not 
subject them to CERCLA liability.  The Litgo Appellants and 
Sanzari Appellees argue that courts have broad discretion in 
considering equitable factors when allocating responsibility, 
and these factors could include both the fact that the United 
States Appellees leased Columbia Aircraft equipment and the 
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fact that Columbia Aircraft was assisting with the war effort.  
See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1060 
(9th Cir. 2002). Although the United States Appellees’ 
relationship with Columbia Aircraft may be a factor that the 
Court could have considered in allocating costs, the decision 
not to take that factor into account was well within the 
Court’s discretion, and is not reversible error. 
 The Litgo Appellants and the Sanzari Appellees also 
challenge the significant size of their own shares of 
responsibility, given that they were deemed PRPs as owners 
and operators, rather than as parties directly involved in the 
disposal of waste.  As the Litgo Appellants point out, it may 
be unusual for an owner or operator who played no role in the 
discharge to be allocated such a large percentage of the costs.  
See, e.g., Am. Color & Chem. Corp., 918 F. Supp. at 959–60 
(0% to current owner); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 430 
(5% to current owner); Alcan-Toyo Am., Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 
346–47 (10% to current owner).  In most of the cases they 
cite, however, the current owners did not take steps to delay 
the remediation process, or to conceal the contamination 
problem.  Compare Am. Color & Chem. Corp., 918 F. Supp. 
at 959–60 (owner did not contribute to release and fully 
cooperated with state and local officials), with Bedford 
Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 430 (fact that owner delayed cleanup 
served as an “independent basis for imposing some liability”).  
And perhaps more importantly, in each of these cases, one of 
the PRPs was directly responsible for the release or discharge 
of waste, so it was reasonable to allocate a substantial portion 
of the costs to that party.  See Am. Color & Chem. Corp., 918 
F. Supp. at 948, 959–60 (party whose activities resulted in the 
discharge of waste held fully responsible); Bedford Affiliates, 
156 F.3d at 422, 430 (party at fault assigned 95% of the 
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responsibility); Alcan-Toyo Am., Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 345, 
347 (companies that deposited coal tar at site held responsible 
for 90% of future costs).  Here, the most responsible parties—
Columbia Aircraft, Signo, JANR, and NJDEP—either were 
not joined as parties in the suit, or could not be sued under 
CERCLA.
11
  Thus, the unavailability of the most responsible 
parties accounts for the relatively high allocations assigned to 
the Litgo Appellants and the Sanzari Appellees. 
 The Sanzari Appellees raise several additional 
equitable claims, which require only brief discussion.  First, 
they claim that the Court should have taken into account the 
settlement agreements that Goldstein reached with two other 
parties—Dande Plastics and Wausau Insurance—during the 
1996 proceedings.  See K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 
472 F.3d 1009, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that courts 
should generally take settlements into account to avoid 
duplicate recovery).  Although the Court did not rely on the 
settlement agreement in determining the Litgo Appellants’ 
allocation of responsibility, it did deduct the amount that the 
Litgo Appellants had received in these settlements from the 
total remediation costs, which avoided the problem of 
duplicate recovery. 
 Second, the Sanzari Appellees claim that the District 
Court should have considered prior litigation positions taken 
by Goldstein in its suit against EWMA.  The Sanzari 
Appellees contend that Goldstein’s allegations of negligence 
                                                   
11
 The NJDEP Commissioner was immune from suit 
under the Eleventh Amendment, Columbia Aircraft was 
defunct long before the suit began, and the parties do not 
explain why Signo and JANR were not joined. 
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and substandard services were essentially admissions that the 
Litgo Appellants paid too much for the remedial services that 
they received, and the District Court should have taken those 
admissions into account. The Sanzari Appellees point to no 
case law suggesting that courts are required to take prior 
inconsistent positions into account in allocating remediation 
costs.  See Alcan-Toyo Am., Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 346–47 
(explaining that “estoppel . . . may be considered in the 
allocation of contribution shares” (emphasis added)).  In any 
event, the Sanzari Appellees ignore that the District Court did 
take into account the Litgo Appellants’ prior allegations 
against its own consultant in its damages determination.  
 Third, the Sanzari Appellees claim that the District 
Court failed to fully account for the nature of the Sales 
Agreement between Sanzari and Goldstein.  Pursuant to the 
Sales Agreement, Goldstein agreed to assume Sanzari’s 
environmental obligations, and he was assigned the right to 
pursue claims against Sanzari’s former tenants and others.  
He used the assignment to pursue Sanzari’s insurer, Sanzari’s 
environmental consultants, and Dande Plastics in the 1996 
litigation.  A review of the record shows, however, that the 
District Court did give weight to Goldstein’s assumption of 
risk when it assigned the Litgo Appellants 70% of the 
remediation costs.  It also took into account Sanzari’s failure 
to disclose relevant information to Goldstein before he chose 
to assume that risk.  The District Court’s balancing of these 
two factors was not an abuse of discretion.
12
 
                                                   
12
 We further note that, contrary to the Litgo 
Appellants’ and Sanzari Appellees’ contentions, there is 
nothing inconsistent about the District Court’s finding that, 
although Sanzari failed to disclose all relevant information 
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 Finally, the Sanzari Appellees contend that the District 
Court erred in holding them responsible for the costs of soil 
remediation, in addition to the costs of groundwater 
remediation.  The Sanzari Appellees argue that they were 
candid with the Litgo Appellants about the possibility of soil 
contamination.  They also claim that, even if they were 
responsible for the installation of a faulty well, that defect 
would have only increased groundwater—not soil—
contamination. The District Court addressed these arguments 
in its opinion on the motions for reconsideration.  It explained 
that it “had taken this argument into consideration as one of 
the factors in its decision to reduce the Sanzari Appellees’ 
final allocation to 27%,” but that it did not believe that it was 
necessary to separate the costs.  Sanzari’s failure to disclose 
had consequences that extended beyond responsibility for the 
groundwater contamination alone, and the Court did not 
clearly err in holding the Sanzari Appellees responsible for 
part of the costs of soil remediation. 
D.  Settlement Credit 
 After the hearing on liability and allocation of costs, 
the United States Appellees and the Litgo Appellants reached 
an agreement on damages.  They stipulated that the Litgo 
Appellants had incurred $1,729,279 in CERCLA response 
                                                                                                                  
about the contamination on the Property, Goldstein 
appreciated that there were risks involved in the transaction 
when he entered into the Sales Agreement.  Goldstein had 
ample information suggesting that contamination was an issue 
and could be costly; he simply did not have the specific test 
results that Sanzari withheld, showing that it was, in fact, 
going to be very costly. 
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costs, and that the United States Appellees owed $51,878.37 
(3% of the total damages).  Following the damages hearing, 
the District Court determined that the Litgo Appellants 
actually had incurred $1,566,236.78 in recoverable costs—an 
amount less than had been stipulated.  The Sanzari Appellees 
argue that they should have received a credit for the 3% 
difference between the amount stipulated and the amount of 
the Litgo Appellants’ actual damages.  Otherwise, they 
contend, the Litgo Appellants will be overcompensated for 
the remediation costs that they incurred. 
 As the Sanzari Appellees note, CERCLA is designed 
to permit plaintiffs to recover costs expended, or costs that 
will need to be expended.  It includes certain provisions to 
ensure that plaintiffs do not receive a windfall.  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (explaining that a settlement that resolves 
a person’s liability to the United States or a State “reduces the 
potential liability of the others by the amount of the 
settlement”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (“Any person who 
receives compensation for removal costs or damages or 
claims pursuant to this chapter shall be precluded from 
recovering compensation for the same removal costs or 
damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal 
law.”).  These provisions do not directly apply to the situation 
here—that is, where a government entity has resolved its 
liability to a non-governmental entity in a settlement 
agreement.  There is nothing in the statutory language 
mandating that the District Court give the Sanzari Appellees a 
settlement credit. 
 Based on CERCLA’s general policy against double 
recovery, however, courts have found that prior settlements 
not governed by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) should be taken into 
account as an equitable factor in allocating responsibility and 
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awarding damages.  See, e.g., K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship, 472 F.3d 
at 1017–18 (finding that a district court abused its discretion 
when it “neither credited [prior] settlements against the 
judgment nor articulated an equitable reason for not doing 
so,” id. at 1018); see also Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 
F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (treating the existence of 
prior settlements as an equitable factor to be considered).  
Here, the District Court took into account other settlements 
that the Litgo Appellants had previously entered into.  It 
determined that a credit to the Sanzari Appellees based on the 
stipulation was not appropriate, but did not explain why.   
 Although the District Court did not explicitly state 
why it refused to award a settlement credit, it clearly 
recognized the importance of avoiding double recovery, as it 
subtracted the other settlement awards the Litgo Appellants 
had received from the total remediation costs.  The Court 
provided a thorough and detailed discussion of other 
equitable factors that it considered, including the Sanzari 
Appellees’ conduct, and these other factors may have led the 
Court to believe that a settlement credit of $4,891.27—less 
than one percent of the total costs being allocated among the 
parties—was not warranted.  Although the Court should have 
explained its reasoning in denying the additional settlement 
credit, this determination was a very small part of the 
allocation process, and we are confident that the Court 
recognized the relevant factors and considered them.  Cf. 
Beazer E., 412 F.3d at 446 (district court abused its discretion 
when it gave one equitable factor undue weight and, in doing 
so, entirely failed to consider another factor).  We thus hold 
that the District Court’s refusal to credit the Sanzari 
Appellees for the United States Appellees’ overpayment is 
not reversible error. 
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E.  Prejudgment Interest 
 Although we agree almost entirely with the District 
Court’s thorough assessment of the parties’ CERCLA claims, 
we will reverse its order to the extent that it denied the Litgo 
Appellants’ request for prejudgment interest under CERCLA 
§ 107(a). 
 An award of prejudgment interest under § 107(a) of 
CERCLA is mandatory.  Caldwell Trucking PRP v. Rexon 
Tech. Corp., 421 F.3d 234, 247 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (“The amounts recoverable in [a § 107(a) 
action] shall include interest.” (emphasis added)). The 
Sanzari Appellees recognize that the Litgo Appellants 
brought this case as a § 107(a) cost recovery action, but argue 
that when the Appellees sought contribution from the Litgo 
Appellants and each other, “the case effectively became a 
straight allocation case, subject to Section 113(f).”  Sanzari 
Br. 76.  They contend that prejudgment interest is 
discretionary under § 113(f). 
 The Sanzari Appellees’ argument mischaracterizes the 
nature of the proceedings between the Litgo Appellants and 
Appellees.  Because they bore the costs of remediation, the 
Litgo Appellants were entitled to bring suit to recover costs 
against the Appellees under § 107(a), Atl. Research Corp., 
551 U.S. at 139, and they did so.  Although Appellees 
properly sought contribution from each other and from the 
Litgo Appellants under § 113(f), this did not transform the 
case into a “straight allocation case” and eliminate the Litgo 
Appellants’ § 107(a) claim.  Indeed, Appellees’ right to bring 
a suit for contribution was premised on a finding of liability 
under § 107(a).  As the Supreme Court explained in Atlantic 
Research: 
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[T]he remedies available under §§ 107(a) and 
113(f) complement each other by providing 
causes of action to persons in different 
procedural circumstances.  Section 113(f)(1) 
authorizes a contribution action to PRPs with 
common liability stemming from an action 
instituted under . . . § 107(a).  And § 107(a) 
permits cost recovery (as distinct from 
contribution) by a private party that has itself 
incurred cleanup costs. 
551 U.S. at 139 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also id. at 138–39 (“The statute authorizes a 
PRP to seek contribution ‘during or following’ a suit under 
. . . § 107(a).” (emphasis added)).  Therefore, the Litgo 
Appellants’ claim was a § 107(a) claim. 
 Because the imposition of prejudgment interest under 
§ 107(a) is mandatory, the Sanzari Appellees’ equitable 
arguments against the imposition of interest are unavailing.  
The Litgo Appellants recovered under § 107(a), so they are 
entitled to prejudgment interest.  We will therefore remand 
for the District Court to calculate that interest. 
IV.  Spill Act Claims 
 Like CERCLA, the Spill Act permits courts to 
“allocate the costs of cleanup and removal among liable 
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines 
are appropriate.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a).  
The District Court determined that both the Litgo Appellants 
and the Sanzari Appellees were liable under the Spill Act for 
response costs incurred for petroleum-related soil 
contamination.  Based on the same factors considered for 
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CERCLA cost allocation, it allocated 67% of the costs to the 
Litgo Appellants and 33% of the costs to the Sanzari 
Appellees. 
 The Sanzari Appellees argue that the District Court 
erred in assigning them liability under the Spill Act because 
they did not own or transport any of the hazardous materials 
stored in the JANR warehouse, nor did they exercise control 
over the warehouse at the time of NJDEP’s botched cleanup 
in the 1980s.  We disagree.   
Under the Spill Act, if a party owns property at the 
time of a discharge, they are responsible for that discharge. 
See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant, 51 A.3d 816, 829–30 
(N.J. 2012) (citing Marsh v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 703 
A.2d 927, 931 (N.J. 1997)); see also N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 7:1E-1.6 (defining “person responsible for a discharge” to 
include “[e]ach owner or operator of any facility, vehicle or 
vessel from which a discharge has occurred”).  For liability to 
attach, the plaintiff must also show that there was a 
“reasonable nexus” between the discharge of waste for which 
the defendant is responsible and the contamination on the site.  
Dimant, 51 A.3d at 832–33, 835 (holding that there was an 
insufficient nexus between the discharge caused by the 
defendant and the contamination at the site when there was no 
evidence connecting fluid leaking onto a paved driveway with 
any of the complained-of contamination found in residential 
wells).  Here, the Sanzari Appellees were the owners of the 
Litgo Property when hazardous waste was stored at the JANR 
warehouse, and when NJDEP disposed of that hazardous 
waste improperly.  Because evidence presented at trial 
connected the JANR warehouse discharge to the 
contamination at the Litgo Property, the District Court did not 
err in concluding that the Sanzari Appellees were liable under 
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the Spill Act.  Nor did the District Court err in allocating Spill 
Act costs, for the same reasons we discussed regarding the 
CERCLA cost allocation. 
V.  RCRA Claims 
 RCRA was enacted “to reduce the generation of 
hazardous waste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, 
and disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated.”  
Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996).  To 
accomplish this goal, RCRA permits citizen suits against any 
person who has contributed or is contributing to the handling 
or disposal of waste “which may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” and 
authorizes district courts to issue injunctions to alleviate that 
harm.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).  Courts may also “award 
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert 
witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing 
party, whenever the court determines such an award is 
appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).   
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Sanzari Appellees on the Litgo Appellants’ RCRA 
claim, based on New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine.  
Under that doctrine, all claims which arise from related facts 
or the same transaction or series of transactions must be 
joined together.  DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 
1995).  If a plaintiff could have brought a related claim in a 
prior state court proceeding and failed to do so, he will be 
barred from bringing that claim in the future.  He would not, 
however, be barred if the state court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claim.  See Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin 
Mem’l Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1988).  The 
District Court determined that the RCRA claim was 
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sufficiently related to the claims brought by the Litgo 
Appellants in the 1996 proceedings that the entire controversy 
doctrine applied.  It concluded that state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over RCRA claims, so the claim could 
have been brought in the prior proceeding. 
 The Litgo Appellants’ RCRA claims against the 
United States Appellees proceeded to trial.  The Court found 
that the United States Appellees were liable under RCRA 
because they “contributed to the storage and disposal of 
hazardous wastes which have been linked to the 
contamination at the Litgo Property.”  Litgo I, 2010 WL 
2400388, at *32.  It expressed doubt, however, as to whether 
injunctive relief was appropriate.  It explained that the United 
States Appellees were not “currently taking any actions at the 
site that pose an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment and thus there is no need to 
‘restrain’ [them].”  Id. at *40.  The Court decided not to enter 
an injunction at that time because it did “not feel that the 
issue of what injunctive relief would be appropriate has been 
sufficiently addressed by the parties.”  Id.  It explained that 
the issue of what, if any, injunctive relief should be granted 
could be addressed at the damages hearing. 
 Before the hearing on damages, the United States 
Appellees and the Litgo Appellants entered into a settlement 
agreement.  The Litgo Appellants dismissed their claim for 
injunctive relief under RCRA, but claimed to have 
“reserve[d] their right to seek litigation costs from the United 
States [Appellees] as a ‘prevailing party’ under Section 
7002(e) of RCRA.”  Supp. App. 8.  The Litgo Appellants then 
moved for costs, which were denied.   
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 The Litgo Appellants now challenge the District 
Court’s dismissal of their RCRA claim against the Sanzari 
Appellees and its denial of litigation costs.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will reverse the District Court’s summary 
judgment in favor of the Sanzari Appellees and remand for 
further proceedings.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of costs and attorney’s fees. 
A.  Jurisdiction Over RCRA Claims 
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Sanzari Appellees on the RCRA claim because it 
determined that state and federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over RCRA claims, such that the claim was 
foreclosed by the entire controversy doctrine.  Because we 
hold that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
claims brought under RCRA, we will remand this claim for 
further proceedings.  
 RCRA provides, in relevant part: 
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this 
subsection [permitting actions against alleged 
polluters] shall be brought in the district court 
for the district in which the alleged violation 
occurred or the alleged endangerment may 
occur.  Any action brought under paragraph 
(a)(2) of this subsection [permitting actions 
against the administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)] may be brought in 
the district court for the district in which the 
alleged violation occurred or in the District 
Court of the District of Columbia.  The district 
court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to 
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the amount in controversy or the citizenship of 
the parties, . . . to restrain any person who has 
contributed or who is contributing to the past or 
present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste. 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphases added).  The overwhelming 
majority of courts that have addressed this issue have read 
this provision to confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal 
courts, based on the statute’s instruction that RCRA claims 
“shall be brought” in a “district court.”  See Blue Legs v. U.S. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 
1989); Interfaith Cmty. Org. Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 295, 304 (D.N.J. 2010); Remington v. Mathson, 
2010 WL 1233803, at *6–9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010); K-7 
Enterprises, L.P. v. Jester, 562 F. Supp. 2d 819, 827 (E.D. 
Tex. 2007); Spillane v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 728, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2003); White & Brewer 
Trucking, Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (C.D. Ill. 
1997); Prisco v. New York, 1992 WL 88165, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 22, 1992); Middlesex Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. 
N.J., Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 645 F. Supp. 715, 719 (D.N.J. 
1986).
13
   The Sixth Circuit, in contrast, has found that RCRA 
                                                   
13
 We have previously noted that the view that federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over RCRA claims 
“accords with that of most other courts to have considered the 
question.” See Raritan Baykeeper v. NL Indus., Inc., 660 F.3d 
686, 693 (3d Cir. 2011).  We did not thoroughly analyze this 
issue in Raritan Baykeeper, however, because both parties 
conceded that state courts did not have concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Id. 
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does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts, Davis 
v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 1998), and the 
District Court followed that path. 
 Under our federal system, there is a “deeply rooted 
presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction.”  
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990); see also Yellow 
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).  
This presumption “is, of course, rebutted if Congress 
affirmatively ousts the state courts of jurisdiction over a 
particular federal claim.”  Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459.  Congress 
may divest state courts of jurisdiction “either explicitly or 
implicitly,” although its intent to do so must be clear.  Id. 
(quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 
478 (1981).   Thus, exclusive jurisdiction may be conferred 
“by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable 
implication from legislative history, or by a clear 
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal 
interests.”  Id. at 459–60 (quoting Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 
478)). 
 We agree with the majority of courts that have 
addressed this issue that the language of § 6972(a) 
unambiguously demonstrates that federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over RCRA claims.  The statute 
provides that RCRA claims “shall be brought” in a “district 
court.”  As used in this context, “shall be brought” is most 
naturally read as a mandate; the suit must be brought in a 
district court.  See Middlesex Cnty. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders, 645 F. Supp. at 719 (citing United States v. 
Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1984)).  When written in 
the United States Code, “district court” refers to federal, not 
state, trial courts.  Indeed, other statutes instructing parties to 
file suit in a “district court” involve exclusively federal 
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claims.
14
  A provision stating that plaintiffs must file in 
federal court is sufficient to establish that federal courts have 
exclusive federal jurisdiction.  See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 471 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“In the standard fields of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction, the governing statutes specifically recite 
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 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (CERCLA) (action 
“shall be brought in the district court for the district in which 
the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment 
may occur”) and 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over CERCLA actions); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1402(d) (“Any civil action under section 2409a to quiet title 
to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is 
claimed by the United States shall be brought in the district 
court of the district where the property is located or, if located 
in different districts, in any of such districts.”); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1403 (eminent domain) (“Proceedings to condemn real 
estate for the use of the United States or its departments or 
agencies shall be brought in the district court of the district 
where the land is located or, if located in different districts in 
the same State, in any of such districts.”); 39 U.S.C. 
§ 3012(b)(1) (civil action brought by the post office) (“Any 
such action shall be brought in the district court of the United 
States for the district in which the defendant resides or 
receives mail.”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (granting federal 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over fines and penalties incurred 
under federal statute).  When concurrent jurisdiction exists, 
litigants are not similarly limited to district courts.  See, e.g., 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII) (“Such an action may be 
brought in any judicial district in the State in which the 
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been 
committed . . . .”).   
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that suit may be brought ‘only’ in federal court; that the 
jurisdiction of federal courts shall be ‘exclusive,’ or indeed 
even that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be 
‘exclusive of the courts of the States’” (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted) (citing the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(5), as an example of a 
statute that divested state courts of jurisdiction by directing 
plaintiffs to file suit in a United States district court)); cf. id. 
at 460–61 (explaining that a provision stating that a person 
“may sue . . . in any appropriate United States district court” 
did not suggest that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction, 
because “[i]t provides that suits of the kind described ‘may’ 
be brought in the federal district courts, not that they must be” 
(emphasis added)).
15
 
 The Sanzari Appellees, relying on the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Davis, argue that the Supreme Court has 
previously determined that language similar to the language 
in RCRA does not deprive the state courts of jurisdiction.  In 
Yellow Freight, the Supreme Court addressed whether state 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under 
Title VII, which provides: 
                                                   
15
 Although Congress could have explicitly used the 
phrase “exclusive jurisdiction”—and often does so—we 
reject our dissenting colleague’s suggestion that statutes must 
invoke a “talismanic term” to divest state courts of 
jurisdiction.  Dissenting Op. at 7.  Such a requirement 
contravenes the Supreme Court’s repeated instruction that 
Congress may explicitly or implicitly divest state courts of 
jurisdiction.  See Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459 (quoting Gulf 
Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478). 
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Each United States district court and each 
United States court of a place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
jurisdiction of actions brought under this 
subchapter.   
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (emphasis added).  The Supreme 
Court held that this language did not “expressly confine[] 
jurisdiction to the federal courts or oust[] state courts of their 
presumptive jurisdiction.”  Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823.  
The Sanzari Appellees argue that the same reasoning applies 
to the text of RCRA, and the Sixth Circuit expressed the same 
view in Davis, opining: 
The “shall have” language [in Title VII] was not 
deemed to be sufficient evidence that Congress 
intended to divest the state courts of jurisdiction 
over those matters.  In the same way, the “shall” 
language in the RCRA enforcement provision 
does not grant exclusive jurisdiction to the 
federal courts in suits brought pursuant thereto.   
Davis, 148 F.3d at 612.   
 The similarities between the language at issue in Title 
VII (“shall have jurisdiction”) and RCRA (“shall be brought 
in the district court”) are, at best, superficial. The former is 
merely a grant of authority; nothing in the statement “Each 
United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction” is 
inconsistent with concurrent jurisdiction.  See Gulf Offshore 
Co., 453 U.S. at 479 (“It is black letter law . . . that the mere 
grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust 
a state court from concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of 
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action.”).  The latter is, by contrast, an order requiring 
litigants to bring RCRA claims in a district court.
16
  
 The Sanzari Appellees argue, and our dissenting 
colleague agrees, that this phrase could be read to mean that 
“if a citizen suit claim is brought in federal court, then it must 
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 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Davis has been 
criticized in several academic journals.  See Jason M. Levy, 
Note, Conflicting Enforcement Mechanisms Under RCRA: 
The Abstention Battleground Between State Agencies and 
Citizen Suits, 39 Ecology L.Q. 373, 398 (2012) (describing 
Davis as a “curious decision” that “defies logic”); A. Mark 
Segreti, Jr., RCRA Citizen Suits and State Courts: 
Jurisdictional Trap After Davis v. Sun Oil Company, 19 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 73, 92−93 (2001) (“The court did not consider 
the total phrase ‘shall be brought in the district court for the 
district,’ apparently not seeing the significance of a 
mandatory designation of a court, as opposed to merely 
conferring jurisdiction on the court by stating that the courts 
‘shall have’ jurisdiction.”); Charlotte Gibson, Note, Citizen 
Suits Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: 
Plotting Abstention on a Map of Federalism, 98 Mich. L. 
Rev. 269, 282 (1999) (remarking that “Title VII’s 
jurisdictional provision is easily distinguishable from 
RCRA’s”).  Even the commentator cited by the dissent, who 
approved of the result in Davis, has described the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning as “doubtful,” given the differences 
between the provision in Title VII and the language used in 
RCRA.  Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, 
Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental 
Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 Yale L.J. 1003, 1017 
(2001). 
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be brought in the district where the violation or alleged 
endangerment occurred, rather than the district where a 
defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction,” Sanzari 
Br. 65 (citing Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 953 F. Supp. 890, 895 
(S.D. Ohio 1996)); Dissenting Op. at 10−11 (quoting 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, 
and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-
Article III Plaintiffs, 110 Yale L.J. 1003, 1007 (2001)).  The 
problem with this interpretation, however, is that the statutory 
language is plainly unconditional.  The statute does not 
instruct claimants on what to do “if” they file in federal court.  
Instead, it mandates: “Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of 
this subsection shall be brought in the district court for the 
district in which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged 
endangerment may occur.”  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis 
added); see also Elmendorf, supra at 1017 (“[T]he RCRA 
citizen-suit provision, if read literally, affirmatively requires 
citizens to bring their claim in one particular and presumably 
federal court (the district court for the judicial district in 
which the alleged violation occurred).”).
17
 
                                                   
17
 The law review note on which the dissent relies 
argues that the RCRA provision is ambiguous because it uses 
the phrase “district court” instead of the phrase “United States 
district court.”  This ambiguity, the note contends, permits 
courts to read the provision as conditional.  It suggests that a 
statute with a similar provision—the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA)—likely could not be read as conditional 
because it uses the phrase “United States district court” 
instead. 
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In stating that citizen suits “shall be brought in 
the United States district court for the district in 
which the alleged violation occurred,” TSCA 
resolves the ambiguity in RCRA and comes as 
close as a statute can to reserving jurisdiction 
expressly to the federal courts without use of 
the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction.”  To find that 
TSCA confers state court jurisdiction, one 
would have to abandon plain meanings 
altogether, massaging the word “shall” until it 
acquires the shape of “may.”  
 
Elmendorf, supra at 1019.  Because “district court,” in fact, 
unambiguously refers to federal courts, we do not find this 
distinction to be persuasive.  We “would have to abandon 
plain meanings altogether” to find that parties may bring a 
RCRA claim in state court. 
The dissent further suggests that our interpretation of 
the statute could have strange results, as “RCRA does not 
consistently use the term ‘shall’ while dictating the 
procedures for filing a citizen complaint.”  Dissenting Op. at 
11.  It claims that our interpretation may implicitly permit 
suits against the EPA or other agencies in state court, even 
though plaintiffs may only bring suits against polluters in 
federal district court.  Although we need not reach the issue 
of whether suits brought against the EPA can be brought in 
state court in this case, we note that we do not think that this 
result necessarily follows from the text of the statute.  As 
explained above, RCRA provides: 
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this 
subsection [permitting actions against alleged 
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polluters] shall be brought in the district court 
for the district in which the alleged violation 
occurred or the alleged endangerment may 
occur. Any action brought under paragraph 
(a)(2) of this subsection [permitting actions 
against the administrator of the EPA] may be 
brought in the district court for the district in 
which the alleged violation occurred or in the 
District Court of the District of Columbia. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).  Read as a whole, the provision may use 
“shall” in the first sentence because plaintiffs filing suits 
against polluters have only one choice—they must file suit in 
the district court in the district where the violation occurred.  
The use of “may” in the second sentence could simply 
suggest that plaintiffs filing against the EPA administrator, in 
contrast, have two choices—the district court in the district 
where the violation occurred, or the District Court for the 
District of Columbia.  The two provisions, taken together, do 
not necessarily suggest that a plaintiff could file suit against 
an agency in the district court in the district where the 
violation occurred, in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, or in a state court.  Other statutes that have been 
interpreted as permissive have been stand-alone provisions; 
they have not been found in a similar context.  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (statute found to be permissive in Charles 
Dowd Box, Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), which 
states only that suits “may” be brought “in any appropriate 
United States district court”); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) 
(Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 
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 Because the New Jersey state court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the RCRA claim, the District Court 
erred in determining that the entire controversy doctrine 
applied and in granting summary judgment to the Sanzari 
Appellees on that basis.  Thus, we will reverse this aspect of 
the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings.
18
 
B.  Litigation Costs under RCRA 
 The Litgo Appellants also claim that the District Court 
erred in denying their request for an award of $4,751,201.88 
in litigation costs, including attorney’s fees, against the 
                                                   
18
 The dissent claims that our approach will “‘result in 
a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and 
primary power over land and water use,’ thus disrupting the 
balance of state and federal regulation over state, county, and 
local pollution that both Congress and the Supreme Court 
have recognized and respected.”  Dissenting Op. at 3−4 
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 
174 (2001)).  We disagree.  We hold only that the rights 
provided by RCRA’s citizen suit provision must be enforced 
in federal court.  This holding does not prevent New Jersey 
from enforcing its own environmental statutes and common 
law.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (“Nothing in this section shall 
restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may 
have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of 
any standard or requirement relating to the management of 
solid waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State 
agency).”). 
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United States Appellees.  Although RCRA gives courts 
discretion to award a “prevailing or substantially prevailing 
party” litigation costs, see 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e), the District 
Court refused to grant such an award here, in part because it 
determined that the Litgo Appellants were not prevailing or 
substantially prevailing parties.
19
  We will affirm on that 
basis. 
 To have “prevailed” or “substantially prevailed” on 
their claims, the Litgo Appellants must have “secure[d] a 
material alteration of [their] legal relationship” with the 
United States Appellees—that is, they must have obtained 
some kind of judicial relief.  NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire 
& Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 486 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (prevailing party); United States v. 
Craig, 694 F.3d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 2012) (substantially 
prevailing party); see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 
606 (2001).  A party who “has failed to secure a judgment on 
the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has 
nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit 
brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct” 
is not a prevailing party.  Buckhannon Bd., 532 U.S. at 600 
(“[W]e have not awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff 
has . . . acquired a judicial pronouncement that the defendant 
has violated the Constitution unaccompanied by ‘judicial 
                                                   
19
 The District Court further determined that an award 
of litigation costs would be inappropriate for equitable 
reasons.  Because we agree with the District Court that the 
Litgo Appellants were not prevailing or substantially 
prevailing parties, we need not address this alternative 
holding. 
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relief,’” id. at 605–06 (internal citations omitted)); see also 
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) (“Respect for 
ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least 
some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to 
prevail.”).  
 The District Court found that the United States 
Appellees were liable parties under RCRA.  It did not, 
however, grant relief on that claim.  Instead, it reserved the 
question of “what, if any, injunctive relief is appropriate” for 
the hearing on damages.  Litgo I, 2010 WL 2400388, at *40 
n.36.  The Litgo Appellants and the United States Appellees 
then entered into a settlement agreement, so the District Court 
never decided whether injunctive relief was proper.  Because 
the Litgo Appellants never obtained judicial relief on their 
CERCLA claim, the District Court correctly found that they 
are not entitled to litigation costs. 
VI.  Closure Act Claim 
 Finally, the Litgo Appellants requested rescission of 
the Sales Agreement under the New Jersey Closure Act, 
which requires sellers of land to disclose whether the property 
has ever been used as a landfill in the contract of sale.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-116(a).  Contracts that do not disclose that 
there was a landfill on the property are voidable.  Id. § 13:1E-
116(b).  The Litgo Appellants argued at trial that there had 
been a sanitary landfill on the Litgo Property, and that the 
Sanzari Appellees failed to disclose that fact.  The District 
Court determined that there was insufficient evidence to find 
that there had been a sanitary landfill. 
 We cannot say that the District Court’s conclusion was 
clearly erroneous.  Although evidence presented at trial 
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demonstrated that there was a landfill on the properties 
adjacent to the Litgo Property, the evidence was ambiguous 
as to whether the Property itself had been put to such a use.  
The District Court listed its reasons for finding that the Litgo 
Appellants had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the Property was used as a landfill, which included: (1) 
lack of documentary evidence; (2) physical evidence 
suggesting that the Property had not been used for such a 
purpose; and (3) physical evidence suggesting that the 
Property would not have been a good site to use for such a 
purpose.  Because these findings are supported by the record, 
the District Court did not err in denying the Litgo Appellants’ 
request for rescission. 
* * * 
 For the reasons discussed herein, we agree with the 
great majority of the District Court’s comprehensive and 
thoughtful consideration of this complex case, and will affirm 
its judgment in all respects save two: (1) the Litgo Appellants 
should have been awarded prejudgment interest; and (2) the 
District Court erred in dismissing the RCRA claim against the 
Sanzari Appellees.  We will vacate the District Court’s order 
in those respects and will remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
There is only one issue in this appeal of true 
significance. Indeed, it has presented us with an issue of first 
impression in this Court: whether the individual states have 
the authority, i.e., concurrent jurisdiction with the federal 
courts, to regulate pollution of the lands and property within 
and comprising the state.  
The majority opinion in this case proclaims that only 
the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) cases affecting the 
property and lands of the sovereign states and that the states 
have no jurisdiction to entertain such cases.
1
  
                                            
1
 The relevant text of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, as amended by the Hazardous and 
Solid Waste Amendments of 1985 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 
et seq., provides:  
 
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection 
shall be brought in the district court for the district in 
which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged 
endangerment may occur. Any action brought under 
paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be brought in 
the district court for the district in which the alleged 
violation occurred or in the District Court of the District 
of Columbia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, 
without regard to the amount in controversy or the 
citizenship of the parties, to enforce the permit, 
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, 
prohibition, or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to 
restrain any person who has contributed or who is 
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, 
2 
 
On this basis, the majority has reversed the District 
Court’s order dismissing Litgo’s RCRA claim. The District 
Court held that Litgo had been obliged to bring that claim in 
New Jersey’s Superior Court, where it had previously brought 
suit against the Sanzari defendants.
2
   
                                                                                                  
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order 
such person to take such other action as may be 
necessary, or both, or to order the Administrator to 
perform the act or duty referred to in paragraph (2), as 
the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil 
penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of this title. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). 
 
2
 The issue of concurrent jurisdiction—i.e. whether the 
respective states’ courts have authority to regulate and 
control pollution within their own state—arises because 
Litgo, the plaintiff, and the Sanzari defendants previously 
litigated similar issues in New Jersey state court, and at no 
time during this previous litigation did Litgo raise a claim 
under RCRA.  
New Jersey has adopted an “Entire Controversy 
Doctrine” which “embodies the principle that the adjudication 
of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only 
one court.” Cogdell by Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 
N.J. 7, 15 (1989). The Entire Controversy Doctrine has been 
codified to provide that “[n]on-joinder of claims required to 
be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the 
preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the 
entire controversy doctrine. . . .” New Jersey Court Rule 
4:30A.  
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The majority opinion reaches its conclusion 
notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing in the text, 
intent, history, or purpose of RCRA indicating that Congress 
affirmatively prohibited the states from hearing and deciding 
cases brought pursuant to RCRA. The majority in its opinion 
has accordingly defied enduring Supreme Court precedents 
that go as far back as 1876. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 
U.S. 130 (1876); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990). 
Those precedents hold that state courts have the same 
jurisdiction over claims involving federal law as federal 
courts do, unless Congress affirmatively and explicitly states 
otherwise.  Congress has not stated otherwise in enacting 
RCRA.  
By failing to give proper weight to the forceful 
presumption that state courts may exercise jurisdiction over 
federal-law claims, the majority opinion also undermines the 
well established primacy of a state in protecting and 
regulating its own property and ground.  Adopting the 
majority’s approach “would result in a significant 
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power 
over land and water use,” Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
                                                                                                  
As this court has recognized, “[a] federal court hearing 
a federal cause of action is bound by New Jersey’s Entire 
Controversy Doctrine, an aspect of the substantive law of 
New Jersey, by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).” Rycoline Products, Inc. v. C & W 
Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1997). There is no 
dispute that, if New Jersey may exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction over RCRA claims, Litgo’s failure to raise this 
claim in the previous New Jersey court litigation precludes it 
from litigating this issue anew in the present case. 
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(2001), thus disrupting the balance of state and federal 
regulation over state, county, and local pollution that both 
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized and 
respected.  
I am therefore obliged to dissent from the 
jurisdictional holding of the majority. I would hold that 
RCRA provides concurrent jurisdiction to both state and 
federal courts in this area of “quintessential state and local 
power.” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006). 
I would therefore affirm the order of the District Court in 
having so held.
3
 
I 
Presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction 
I begin by highlighting the core principles that must 
guide analysis of this issue. The Supreme Court has long 
abided by the “general rule that the grant of jurisdiction to 
one court does not, of itself, imply that the jurisdiction is to 
be exclusive.” United States v. Bank of New York & Trust 
Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479 (1936). As the Supreme Court has 
further emphasized, there is in our federalism a “deeply 
rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court 
jurisdiction.” Tafflin, 493 U.S. 459. This presumption, which 
                                            
3
 I agree with the balance of the majority’s opinion and thus 
would affirm all of the District Court’s comprehensive and 
well reasoned opinion other than its decision on prejudgment 
interest. The District Court denied CERCLA prejudgment 
interest to Litgo when it should have granted it because 
CERCLA § 107(a) mandates that interest be paid. Hence we 
are obliged to reverse and remand for calculation of 
prejudgment interest. 
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the majority recognizes but refuses to follow, is subject to 
rebuttal only “if Congress affirmatively ousts the state courts 
of jurisdiction over a particular federal claim  . . . . ‘by an 
explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from 
legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between 
state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.’” Id. at 459-60 
(emphasis added) (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)).   
 As Justice Stevens explained for a unanimous court in 
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990): 
“Under our ‘system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently 
held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus 
presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under 
the laws of the United States.’” Id. at 823 (quoting Tafflin, 
493 U.S. 458).  The Court looked at Claflin v. Houseman, 93 
U.S. 130 (1876) (involving the Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 
1867) and Gulfshore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 
(involving the Outer Continental Shelflands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 
1333), thus illustrating the traditional, generational, and 
historical context of concurrent jurisdiction. 
 The Court went on to say: “to give Federal Courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over a Federal cause of action, 
Congress must, in an exercise of its powers under the 
Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divest State Courts of their 
presumptive concurrent jurisdiction.” Yellow Freight, 494 
U.S. 823 (emphasis added).  
 In Yellow Freight, the Court was called upon to apply 
these principles in the context of Title VII.  The plaintiff had 
complained about discrimination in the action brought in the 
state court.   Her claim was removed to the federal court, and 
when the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
there was exclusive jurisdiction over the Title VII litigation, 
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In referring to the text 
of Title VII, the Court noted that Title VII had been enacted 
with the provision that: 
“[e]ach United States district court and each United 
States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought 
under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982 
ed.).  
 
Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. 823. The Court held that this 
language, notwithstanding its use of the purportedly 
mandatory term “shall,” contained no language that expressly 
confined jurisdiction to federal courts. Nor did this “shall” 
language operate to oust the state courts of their presumptive 
jurisdiction. In so holding, the Court noted that “omission of 
any such provision [that expressly confines jurisdiction to 
federal courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive 
jurisdiction] is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that 
Congress had no such intent” to confer exclusive jurisdiction 
on the federal courts. Id.   
 To reiterate, the Court went on to emphasize that “[t]o 
give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over a federal cause 
of action, Congress must, in an exercise of its powers under 
the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divest state courts of 
their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction.” Yellow Freight, 
494 U.S. 823 (emphasis added). Absent such an affirmative 
divestment, the Court concluded, even a “persuasive showing 
that most legislators, judges, and administrators who have 
been involved in the enactment, amendment, enforcement, 
and interpretation of Title VII expected that such litigation 
would be processed exclusively in federal courts” was 
inadequate to support exclusive jurisdiction, as “such 
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anticipation does not overcome the presumption of concurrent 
jurisdiction that lies at the core of our federal system.” Id. at 
826. 
II 
Concurrent Jurisdiction in RCRA 
 In enacting RCRA, Congress acknowledged “the 
collection and disposal of solid wastes . . . to be primarily the 
function of State, regional, and local agencies . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6901(a)(4).  The provision of RCRA directly at issue in this 
case states that “[a]ny action under paragraph (a)(1) of this 
subsection shall be brought in the district court for the district 
in which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged 
endangerment may occur.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). Notably, this 
language plainly does not include the talismanic term 
“exclusive jurisdiction,” as does, for example, CERCLA, 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(b),
4
 as well as other statutes conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction.
5
 As these statutes make clear, Congress 
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 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (“Except as provided in 
subsections (a) and (h) of this section, the United States 
district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over 
all controversies arising under this chapter, without regard to 
the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy. 
Venue shall lie in any district in which the release or damages 
occurred, or in which the defendant resides, may be found, or 
has his principal office.”) (emphases added).   
 
5
 For example, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, concerning violations of 
rules governing securities exchanges, provides: “The district 
courts of the United States and the United States courts of any 
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of 
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is perfectly capable of clearly indicating when it intends to 
oust states of their presumptive jurisdiction.  
Absent a clearer grant of exclusive jurisdiction, the 
text of the RCRA cannot be properly read to oust states of 
their presumptive jurisdiction. As the Sixth Circuit held in 
Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998), “the term 
‘shall’ as it is used in [RCRA] does not affirmatively divest 
the state court’s of their presumptive jurisdiction. . . . [T]he 
‘shall’ language in the RCRA enforcement provision does not 
grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts . . . .” Id. at 
612 (emphases added). 
 In determining, contra Davis, that RCRA confers 
exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts, the majority 
                                                                                                  
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all 
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any 
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder.” (emphasis added.) 
Similarly, 16 U.S.C. § 2440, concerning the Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources Convention, provides: “The district 
courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
over any case or controversy arising under the provisions of 
this chapter or of any regulation promulgated under this 
chapter.” (emphasis added.) 
Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), pertaining to patents 
and other intellectual property, states: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising 
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety 
protection, copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall 
have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any 
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, 
or copyrights.” (emphasis added.) 
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opinion emphasizes that “[t]he overwhelming majority of 
courts that have addressed this issue have read this provision 
to confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts, based on the 
statute’s instruction that RCRA claims ‘shall’ be brought in a 
‘district court.’” Maj. Op. at 50. This position rests on two 
fatally flawed foundational arguments: first, that there is 
weighty and persuasive judicial authority on this subject, and 
second, that the phrase “shall be brought in . . . district court” 
represents a textual grant of exclusive jurisdiction. 
“The overwhelming majority of courts” 
 Of the eight cases cited by the majority for the 
proposition that there is consensus on this issue, the majority 
has mustered only a single opinion from a Court of Appeals,  
Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 
(8th Cir. 1989). Blue Legs, an Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals opinion, involves Indian tribes and lands rather than 
the states and state lands.  The opinion limits its discussion to 
just these two sentences: 
Our examination of the RCRA leads us to conclude that 
exhaustion of tribal remedies is not required in this case. 
The RCRA places exclusive jurisdiction in federal 
courts for suits brought pursuant to section 6972(a)(1) 
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection 
[as this case is] shall be brought in the district court 
for the district in which the alleged violation 
occurred. 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). Accord Middlesex County Board 
of Union Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F.Supp. 715, 
719–20 (D.N.J.1986). 
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Blue Legs, 867 F.2d 1098 (8th Cir. 1989).  
The overwhelming majority of District Courts cited by 
the majority opinion as overwhelming authority at best echo 
Blue Legs’ two-sentence decision. Just as Blue Legs provided 
no careful, thoughtful and meaningful analysis, the District 
Courts which echo Blue Legs provide none either. 
 I thus do not regard Blue Legs’ discussion of 
jurisdiction, nor the District Courts’ discussions which follow 
Blue Legs’ two-sentence discussion of jurisdiction, to be 
authoritative—and certainly they are not binding in the area 
of federal/state jurisdiction. 
Venue: the “may” – “shall” distinction 
The substantive textual argument advanced by the 
majority is unconvincing because it fails to appreciate that 
RCRA’s requirement that actions “shall be brought in the 
district court for the district in which the alleged violation 
occurred” imposes a venue restriction that applies only if a 
litigant chooses to file in federal court rather than a 
jurisdictional requirement that a litigant must file in federal 
court. As noted in Christopher S. Elmendorf, State Courts, 
Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental 
Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1017 
(2001): 
One could read RCRA’s mandate that citizen suits 
“shall be brought in the district court for the district in 
which the alleged violation occurred” as operating 
subsequent to the decision to bring a claim in state or 
federal court. Once you have chosen a judicial system, 
then you must bring your claims in the district court for 
the judicial district in which the alleged violation 
occurred. (footnote omitted.)  
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Examining the provision of RCRA at issue reveals that 
it concerns venue rather than jurisdiction. First, RCRA, § 
6972(a), has an express jurisdictional statement. It provides: 
“The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to 
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties . . . 
.” Had Congress intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction, it 
could very naturally and easily have specified that “the 
district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction,” as it has done 
in other statutes, including CERCLA. (See notes 4 and 5, 
supra.) Instead, Congress has set out a facially nonrestrictive 
jurisdictional provision, thus leaving undisturbed the 
presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction. 
Second, RCRA does not consistently use the term 
“shall” when dictating the procedures for filing a citizen 
complaint. The text immediately following the language at 
issue, which relates to suits brought against the administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency for failing to 
perform a non-discretionary action, provides: “Any action 
brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be 
brought in the district court for the district in which the 
alleged violation occurred or in the District Court of the 
District of Columbia.” § 6972(a) (emphasis added).  
As the Supreme Court has recently made clear, 
permissive formulations of this sort cannot overcome the 
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.  Mims v. Arrow Fin. 
Services, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2012) (“Nothing in the 
permissive language of [the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act, 47 U.S.C.] § 227(b)(3) [providing that “A person or 
entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of 
court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State”] 
makes state-court jurisdiction exclusive, or otherwise purports 
12 
 
to oust federal courts of their 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction 
over federal claims.”). 
It cannot be that Congress intended the terms “shall” 
and “may” as variously used in RCRA, § 6972(a), to 
implicitly permit suits against the EPA in state court while 
still insisting on exclusive federal jurisdiction over suits 
against private polluters. Rather, the “may/shall” distinction 
obviously refers to the lesser venue requirements applicable 
to suits against the EPA as opposed to than the more 
restrictive requirement that suits against individual polluters 
be brought where the pollution occurred.  
Third, where Congress has elsewhere used the 
formulation “shall be brought in the district court for the 
district in which the alleged violation occurred,” it has done 
so in provisions expressly concerned with venue.
6
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 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b), for example, contains a 
provision concerning citizen suits that provides: 
 
Venue 
(1) Actions under subsection (a)(1) 
Any action under subsection (a)(1) of this section shall 
be brought in the district court for the district in which 
the alleged violation occurred. 
(2) Actions under subsection (a)(2) 
Any action brought under subsection (a)(2) of this 
section may be brought in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. 
 
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b) provides:  
 
Venue 
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The majority has thus erroneously decided that 
Congress has used a statutory formulation for venue to 
override and trump the Supreme Court’s instruction and 
precedent that both state and federal jurisdiction are available 
under RCRA. Congress in § 6972(a) of RCRA, however, has 
simply dictated which federal district courts have venue over 
RCRA claims and has said nothing impinging upon, 
affecting, or eliminating concurrent state jurisdiction. 
IV 
Pollution regulation – primary state function 
There is, moreover, no incompatibility between RCRA 
and state jurisdiction. Quite to the contrary! When one 
considers the very subject of RCRA, it is all too evident that 
the individual states, each of which is defined by property 
borders, have the primary interest and concern in protecting 
and shielding their own sovereign lands.  RCRA recognizes 
that “the collection and disposal of solid wastes should 
continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and 
local agencies . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4). The important 
state interest in land, moreover, cannot rest at the mercy of 
federal whim or be restricted just to the federal courts for 
remediation. As the Supreme Court has said, in describing the 
limits of federal jurisdiction:  
                                                                                                  
(1) Any action under subsection (a) of this section 
against an owner or operator of a facility shall be 
brought in the district court for the district in which the 
alleged violation occurred. 
(2) Any action under subsection (a) of this section 
against the Administrator may be brought in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
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Permitting [the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] to claim 
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling 
within the “Migratory Bird Rule” would result in a 
significant impingement of the States’ traditional and 
primary power over land and water use. See, e.g., Hess 
v. Port Authority Trans–Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 
30, 44, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994) 
(“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally 
performed by local governments”). Rather than 
expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state balance 
in this manner, Congress chose to “recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of 
States ... to plan the development and use ... of land and 
water resources ....” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).  
 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 531 U.S. 174 (emphasis added).  
For the same reasons that federal authority cannot 
excessively intrude on local regulation of land and water, it is 
essential (absent an express Congressional declaration 
otherwise) that the states should, through their own courts, be 
able to enforce the laws governing pollution of their land, 
even when the source of the law is federal.  
V 
Conclusion 
 I am compelled to part company with my colleagues in 
the majority because they have failed to adhere to Supreme 
Court precedent interpreting Congress’ legislation.  As I have 
pointed out, since at least 1867 the Supreme Court has 
required federal courts to recognize dual jurisdiction in 
matters such as RCRA.  The majority here has not. 
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 Instead of respecting our “system of dual sovereignty,” 
which requires that state courts have inherent authority and 
are thus presumptively competent to adjudicate claims under 
the laws of the United States, the majority has ignored this 
principle and thus defied Supreme Court precedent. See 
Tafflin, 493 U.S. 458 (“Under this system of dual 
sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have 
inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to 
adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United 
States.”). Instead, the majority opinion, as I have pointed out, 
has followed the unanalytic path of the solitary Court of 
Appeals which has held that federal courts have exclusive 
RCRA jurisdiction.  Only the District Courts have adopted 
this position, following the Eighth Circuit opinion of Blue 
Legs without any additional persuasive analysis. 
 The opinions of the District Courts do not follow 
Supreme Court precedent or employ logic in denying RCRA 
state court jurisdiction.  Rather, they have cited to the Blue 
Legs position and to one another in superficial treatment of 
their respective jurisdictional conclusions.  Sadly and 
unfortunately, the majority opinion has followed suit.  
Accordingly, just as with the opinions it has cited, the 
majority opinion lacks authoritative precedential analysis and 
statutory interpretation. The majority opinion, and the courts 
it has looked to, have thus failed to take into consideration the 
traditional, generational, and historical principles and 
precedents of concurrent jurisdiction.   
 It is for that reason that I must dissent.  I cannot join 
the majority opinion, which has remanded this case to the 
District Court again—a case which originated in actions taken 
in the 1940s.  Respectfully, therefore, I would adhere to 
Supreme Court teaching and precedent and hold for the first 
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time in this Court that New Jersey has concurrent jurisdiction 
in RCRA cases with the federal courts.  
In so doing, I would affirm all of the District Court’s 
present judgment in all particulars, with the exception of 
CERCLA prejudgment interest. See note 3, supra. 
